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without any improper influences, inducements, or pressures, direct or
indirect, from any quarter or for any reason, and
(2) that the judiciary is independent of the executive and legislature, and
has jurisdiction, directly or by way of review, over all issues of a
judicial nature.
In his interim report to the Sub-Commission, Dr. Singhvi, who attended the
Siracusa Meeting, stated that the Committee's draft principles "provide an
instructive illustration of comparative and consensual convergence of diverse
perspectives in common accord."18
These ongoing efforts of international bodies and NGOs to implement existing and to fashion new standards governing the independence of judges and
lawyers are crucial to the promotion and protection of internationally recognized
human rights.

SOME PATTERNS OF VIOLATION OF THE INDEPENDENCE
OF JUDGES AND LAWYERS

by Juan Ernesto M~ndez *
This paper attempts to reflect my personal experiences as an advocate before
domestic courts, defending political prisoners and raising issues of fundamental
freedoms, and my more recent professional experience with nongovernmental
organizations dedicated to the protection and promotion of human rights in
foreign countries. It does not focus on the independence of judges and lawyers
as a principle in the international law of human rights, nor does it discuss means
by which that principle might be upheld or enforced.
This presentation only attempts to describe certain patterns of violation of
the independence of the judicial system as those patterns emerge from the
practices of certain countries. It is, therefore, a description of several ways in
which that independence is abused, de facto or de jure, around the world. Although I have attempted to inquire into similar problems in countries of different geographic situation, or governed by different types of regimes, the paper
inevitably concentrates on recent developments in some Latin American countries, and particularly in Argentina.
Finally, the reader is advised to bear in mind that this is the perspective of a
practitioner in the field of human rights, not that of a jurist or a scholar.
Military Courts
The question has been raised as to whether a military court is ipso facto not
independent.1 Before responding to this question, however, I find it useful to
distinguish between the traditional role of military courts and its distortion and
expansion in recent times. Most armed forces throughout the world still retain
military courts to try military personnel for offenses committed during acts of
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duty, or breaches of military discipline. But many governments-usually those
arising from military coups-have, in the recent past, instituted military courts
to exercise jurisdiction over certain offenses committed by civilians.
One of the situations in which this takes place is the imposition of martial law
on a temporary basis to control unrest or to respond to external attacks. Martial
law has the effect of placing all civilians under the authority of military commanders and of expanding the jurisdiction of military courts so that they may
try offenses committed by civilians. This technique was used in Chile in 1973,
and some of its aspects (curfew, for example) remained in effect for long periods.
Some countries have tended to institutionalize martial law, even making it a
permanent feature of their form of government. Pakistan has maintained the
office of Martial Law Administrator since 1977 (the Administrator presides over
all military courts). In 1981 Pakistan passed a Provisional Constitutional Order
(an amendment to the Constitution), which, among other things, virtually'immunizes military court decisions from judicial review.
In other situations, however, military courts are used on a permanent basis
without the establishment of martial law. As in El Salvador since 1980, and in
Argentina since 1976, these military tribunals generally coexist with an official
declaration of a state of siege, although the two are not necessarily connected in
law.
In Argentina the "Consejos de Guerra Especiales" are formed ex post facto,
to try offenses already committed (which violates the specific clause of the
Argentine Constitution related to the principle of "natural judges"). They use
procedures from the Code of Military Justice, and they only allow representation by military officers on active duty, who usually are not trained in law. The
jurisdiction of the Special War Councils is ratione materiae, but there is some
overlap with offenses that are of the competence of civilian courts. In practice
this means that the decision to place a civilian under a military court or under a
federal judge is made by the regional military authorities.
In El Salvador, Decree 507 of December 3, 1980 created military investigative
and trial judgeships. These judges can impose "corrective detention" of up to
120 days even when they have no probable cause to initiate proceedings against
a defendant. Security agents can detain persons for 15 days without intervention of the military investigative judge. The judge's investigation is secret for
180 days before its submission to the trial judge. During that period, the accused has no right to any participation. 2He can be held in incommunicado
detention and without charge for 195 days.
Theoretically these military courts replaced the jurisdiction of civilian courts
over the offenses against the security of the state for which they were created.
In practice, however, they are only used against opponents of the government;
for example, the murders of the American nuns and AID officials, in which
agents of the security forces were thought to be involved, were investigated by
civilian courts.
Although the traditional role of military tribunals (to judge offenses committed by military personnel on active duty) is normally not considered a human
rights problem, it is quite conceivable that, following a period in which the
armed forces of a country have been actively engaged in repressive measures
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against their own population, their crimes or abuses would only be investigated
by military courts, since they are really offenses in the course of duty Human
rights leaders in those countries are justifiably concerned that, in those cases,
military courts may be used to ensure the impunity of crimes committed by
security forces. In this regard, it is interesting to note that legislation recently
proposed in France would create special civilian courts to try military personnel
for offenses committed in the course of duty
For the reasons stated above, military courts, even in their traditional role,
constitute a major departure from the principle of judicial independence and
have a potential for grievous abuse of fundamental human rights. They can only
be acceptable in times of emergency, where some rights are lawfully derogable
under international law and provided that they are used only as extensively and
for as long a period of time as the emergency requires.
Special CivilianCourts
Some countries have resorted to the creation of special tribunals to intervene
in cases of a special category of crimes. Although these courts and their members may be just as independent as the regular court system, they have frequently been criticized for violating the right to be judged by one's "natural
judges." This is especially so when those special courts are created after the fact,
that is, to judge events that have happened before they were created. This is the
case of the Special Tribunals used in Nicaragua to judge "Somocistas" and
former members of the "Guardia Nacional." They were in effect only between
November 1979 and February 1981, and they tried some 4,500 defendants. They
were created ex post facto but were limited in that the government had abolished the death penalty, and they could apply sentences to a maximum of 30
years. They did not use ex post facto legislation but relied on the substantive
law in effect when the crimes were committed. They used expedited procedures,
but most rights of the defendants were observed. They were criticized, however,
for the lack of expertise of their members, only some of whom were required to
be lawyers, and for their authority to judge "in conscience," i.e., without specifying the reasonable links between the evidence and the responsibility of the
accused. As a result, membership in the Guardia Nacional was considered
enough to find a defendant guilty of illicit association and of complicity in the
3
many crimes committed by Somoza's security force.
Ordinary Civilian Courts
In other instances the established judicial branch of a government can have
its independence eroded while maintaining a facade of judicial autonomy
These cases generally take the form of a de jure limitation of their jurisdiction,
even though this limitation generally originates from an act of force, such as a
coup d'6tat. This was the case in Argentina in 1976, when all members of the
judiciary were stripped of their tenure, and 80 percent were replaced. The new
judges have been granted tenure, but they have sworn to uphold the new constitutional order, i.e., the Constitution with amendments enacted by the Junta
since 1976. This means that those amendments are not subject to judicial scru-
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tiny A very similar oath has been required of judges in Pakistan, after the
Provisional Constitutional Order of 1981.
There are also de jure limitations on jurisdiction that do not refer to fundamental constitutional questions, but nevertheless have a great impact on the
rights of the accused. In South Africa and Uruguay, for example, judges are not
allowed to inquire into the legality of incommunicado detentions during interrogation. A different but also serious attempt at a de jure limitation of jurisdiction
is seen by some in the proposal to limit the Article III jurisdiction of U.S. federal
4
courts, if the ultimate objective is to change substantive constitutional law.
De facto limitations on the jurisdiction of ordinary courts are less noticeable,
but can have more devastating effects on human rights. For example, habeas
corpus has been nominally in full effect in Argentina since 1976. But since the
coup of that year, no judge has exercised his investigative functions in habeas
corpus proceedings by visiting detention centers or personally verifying the
accuracy of a report from a police authority As a result, the security forces see
themselves as effectively shielded from any outside investigation. This, in my
view, is the major contributing factor in the establishment of the methodology
of 6,000-20,000 "disappearances" as a means to control political opposition. In
four consecutive cases labeled P~rez de Smith, the Argentine Supreme Court has
upheld the independent investigatory powers of the courts but has refused to
order the lower courts to exercise them in cases of "detenidos-desaparecidos" by
searching beyond the official reports on their whereabouts.
The same lack of effective judicial independence can be found in Argentina in
the cases of administrative detentions without charges, under the powers
granted to the executive branch by the state of siege. Until 1976 the courts
could review the reasonableness of the detention in habeas corpus proceedings.
If the courts found the detention unreasonable, they would authorize a release or
allow the person to go into exile. Now the courts are not exercising the review. In
Zamorano, Timerman, Moya and several other cases, the courts have engaged in
a general abdication of judicial review of administrative action.
An important example of extralegal, de facto limitations happened as recently
as March 1982, in a case in Buenos Aires called Simerman, where the Commander-in-Chief of the Army (who is also President, Gen. Galtieri) refused to
allow an officer who participated in repressive actions to come before the court
and provide testimony on the whereabouts of a person who was detained and
subsequently disappeared, on the grounds that these acts were in performance
of military duty and protected by the secrecy of defense operations. In this case
a person disappeared in 1977 or 1978. A few weeks later her young daughter was
delivered by a high military officer to the grandparents. In the habeas corpus
proceeding to determine the mother's whereabouts, the judge had ordered the
military officer to come and testify
Defense Lawyers
Sometimes lawyers themselves contribute to the lack of independence of the
judiciary In Nicaragua court-appointed counsel to represent Somocistas were
generally ineffective either because the defenders lacked professional experience
(many were senior law students) or because the unpopularity of the causes they
defended led them to simply ask for the clemency of the courts, or to submit
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only character evidence on behalf of the defendants. That has not been the case
in the several cases brought before civilian courts since 1981 for security-related
offenses, except in the cases of Miskito Indian defendants (February 1981), who
were also tried with court-appointed counsel.
Much more frequently, however, lawyers are not the cause, but the victims, of
attempts to destroy judicial independence. Persecution of lawyers can assume
differing forms. One of them is the disbarment of a colleague deemed to have
gone too far in representing his client. That is the case of Dr. Jan Cernogursky in
Czechoslovakia, expelled from the Regional Lawyers Association in Bratislava
on April 15, 1981, as a result of his defense of a political dissident. A related, but
even more serious, attack on the legal profession is the outright dissolution of
bar associations, as when the Government of Syria dissolved the Damascus and
Syrian Bar Associations in 1980 for their stands opposing the prolonged emergency, arbitrary arrests, and torture of political prisoners.
Persecution of individual practitioners is a far more extended practice. It can
take the form of harassment and intimidation, as in the case of Sofia Kalistratova in the Soviet Union, whose house has been searched three times in recent
weeks. Ms. Kalistratova represents many dissidents and as a member of the
Moscow Helsinki Group is closely associated with Dr. Andrei Sakharov.
In other cases, lawyers are persecuted in much more serious ways, such as the
murder of Mlungisi Griffiths Mxenge in South Africa, on November 20, 1981,
and the subsequent incommunicado detention without charges of two members
of his firm, Messrs. Maqudela and Ngeuka, under Section 6 of the Terrorism
Act, which allows for incommunicado detention without charge indefinitely.
These lawyers were actively engaged in the defense of political prisoners and
corresponded with the Southern Africa Project of the Washington Lawyers'
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law. In 1981 at least 13 Guatemalan lawyers
were abducted or murdered. According to the Committee on International Human Rights of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, more than 50
judges, lawyers and law professors were killed or "disappeared" in Guatemala in
1980 and 1981.
In Argentina, a combination of all these practices has been used since the
early 1970s, and they reached dramatic proportions after the military takeover
of March 1976. Since then, at least 90 lawyers have disappeared, more than 100
have been or still are in administrative detention without charges, and hundreds
have been forced into exile as a result of threats and harassment.
My personal case is illustrative. I practiced law in my home town of Mar del
Plata beginning in July 1970. In December 1971, my house was searched by the
police, with a great display of their weapons, after two colleagues and I had filed
court papers submitting evidence of police participation in an attack against a
student assembly that had resulted in the death of an 18-year-old student. In
1973, together with other colleagues, we presented evidence of the existence of
two houses of torture used by the police in Mar del Plata.
Later in 1973 mobs painted threats on the front door of my law office, in the
presence of uniformed police, and then proceeded to paint similar threats
against my life throughout the city For many months I was under surveillance
in my home and office by armed members of rightwing squads. In early 1974, as
I left a meeting in the law school where I taught, I was arrested by the federal
police and wrongfully charged with possession of firearms. A federal judge
dismissed the charges and released me within three days. As a result of these
actions against me, I moved to Buenos Aires, where I was less well known. By

